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Policy recommendations
\ "Coalition of the willing" for an arms 
embargo at EU level
The German government must adopt the European 
Parliament's demand that no more military equipment 
be supplied to Saudi Arabia, expand it to include the 
United Arab Emirates and actively support it within the 
European Union.
\ Stop munitions deliveries by defence 
companies with German participation
The German government must exert pressure on 
Rheinmetall to stop further deliveries of ammunition 
by its foreign subsidiaries and joint ventures to the 
countries of the war coalition.
\ Increase international pressure on 
Gulf Monarchies
The federal government must use diplomatic channels 
to demand information from Saudi Arabia and the UAE 
about the whereabouts of small arms supplied from 
Germany or produced under a German licence. It must 
address the apparent equipment of local militias in 
Yemen with German weapons and forcefully demand 
an explanation for this.
\ A comprehensive arms embargo
In view of the flagrant violation of international humani-
tarian law by the countries involved in the Yemen war,  
export moratoria of limited duration, such as the current 
German ban on arms exports to Saudi Arabia until 30 
March, are not sufficient. Because of the active participa-
tion of other countries in the air raids, the naval blockade 
in the Red Sea and the transfer of arms toYemeni militias, 
the German government must decide on a comprehen-
sive arms embargo that is not limited in time against all 
countries of the Saudi-led coalition.
\ Revoke existing licenses
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Jordan, Sudan and Senegal are militarily directly 
involved in the Yemen war either through their partici-
pation in the air raids, the naval blockade or through 
the deployment of land forces. All of them therefore 
must not receive any military equipment from Germany 
until further notice. The German government has to 
revoke all export licences that have been granted for 
arms exports to these countries.
German arms in the Yemen war
For a comprehensive arms embargo against the war coalition
Marius Bales \ BICC
Max M. Mutschler \ BICC
FOR A COMPREHENSIVE ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST THE WAR COALITION \ M. BALES & MAX M. MUTSCHLER
2 \ \ POLICY BRIEF 2 \ 2019
Introduction
For four years now, a war coalition led by Saudi Arabia 
has been fighting in Yemen against the Shiite Huthi 
rebels. According to the United Nations, nearly 18,000 
civilians have already died in the fighting. Independ-
ent researchers from the Armed Conflict Location 
and Event Data Projects (ACLED) even speak of more 
than 56,000 people killed in the course of the fighting 
between January 2016 and October 2018 alone. Over 
three million Yemenis have fled. 14 million people are 
acutely threatened by hunger; more than 24 million 
people, including 11 million children, depend on  
humanitarian aid. The United Nations speaks of Yemen 
as one of the worst humanitarian disasters in the 
world.
In their coalition agreement in March 2018, CDU/CSU 
and SPD decided to stop exporting weapons to coun-
tries directly involved in the war in Yemen, but German 
defence companies were assured that arms deals  
already approved would not be affected ("Vertrauens- 
schutz") if they could prove that the respective weapons 
would remain exclusively in the recipient country, i.e. 
would not be used in the Yemen war.In response to 
the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at 
the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul in November 
2018, the federal government stopped further arms 
exports licences for Saudi Arabia and asked companies 
not to use existing ones. This temporary moratorium 
was extended twice by the federal government until 
30 March. The arms industry is threatening to sue for 
damages. France and Great Britain are complaining 
about the stop of German supplies for joint arms 
projects.
The federal government must decide how to proceed 
with the expiring moratorium. However, this must 
not be a question only of whether it will be extended 
or not. In view of the flagrant violation of interna-
tional humanitarian law by the countries involved in 
the war in Yemen, this would be far too short-sighted.
The war coalition—Who does what? 
And with what weapons?
The Sunni-Arab war coalition, whose goal is the  
reintroduction of the internationally recognised Pres-
ident Abed Rabbo Mansur Hadi, who lives in exile, is 
led by Saudi Arabia. The Gulf Monarchy participates 
with about 100 fighter planes in the air attacks 
against targets in Yemen and flies the majority of the 
air attacks. In these attacks aircraft, such as US F-15 
Eagle as well as Tornado and Eurofighter Typhoon 
fighter aircraft, both European joint arms project, are 
being used. 
Saudi Arabia received a total of 72 Eurofighters from 
the United Kingdom between 2009 and 2017 for 
around US $8.8 billion. About 30 per cent of these  
Eurofighter Typhoon consist of German components. 
For example the aircraft cannon by Mauser and com-
ponents such as auxiliary power units or fuel outlet 
valves, and numerous parts, for example for the over-
haul of the aircraft’s batteries. In the fourth quarter of 
2017, the German government approved such compo-
nent deliveries for the Saudi Eurofighters. Saudi Arabia 
is also coordinating the deployment of combat air-
craft from all coalition countries. It has been proven 
that in addition to precision-guided ammunition, the 
Royal Saudi Air Force also used cluster ammunition 
and unguided bombs and bombed schools, hospitals, 
food factories and residential areas. Saudi Arabia 
probably also uses Luna reconnaissance drones from 
the German company EMT in Yemen (10 drones were 
delivered from 2011 to 2012). In December 2015, Saudi 
Arabia is also said to have used CAESAR artillery guns 
to bomb Yemen from the Saudi border town of 
Najran.
Between 2010 and 2015, the French arms manufacturer 
Nexter had delivered 132 of these to Saudi Arabia, 
with the Unimog chassis and diesel engines for this 
weapon system coming from Germany.
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The naval blockade in the Red Sea and the Gulf of 
Aden, which was also responsible for the severe  
humanitarian crisis, is also led by the Gulf Monarchy. 
Yemen is dependent on food imports for 85 percent of 
its needs. The international aid organisation Save the 
Children assumes that altogether 85,000 children 
have died of malnutrition in the Yemen conflict since 
2015. It is also possible that patrol boats from the Peene 
shipyard belonging to the Lürssen Group are involved 
in the naval blockade: Saudi Arabia ordered 33 patrol 
boats. The assembly permit in accordance with the 
War Weapons Control Act was granted in 2015. 
To date, the federal government has approved the  
export of 17 of these patrol boats, 15 of which were  
delivered by the time of writing, the first in December 
2016. According to media reports, at least two of these 
patrol boats were repeatedly stationed in a Saudi port 
in which the Saudi Navy simultaneously detained a 
freighter destined for Yemen until the end of August 
2018. In March 2018, two of the boats delivered from 
Germany arrived in the port of Jizan—near the border 
with Yemen—and has since then not sent any trans-
ponder signals.
In addition to the selective deployment of special 
units, Saudi Arabia arms, trains and finances local 
Sunni tribal militants in Yemen, including Islamist 
militants. Its support with materiel also includes 
weapons systems of German design. In 2015, Saudi 
Arabia dropped G3 assault rifles—the federal govern-
ment granted Riyadh permission to produce them 
under license in 1969—to support the Yemeni Army 
and local militias in conquering the city of Aden over 
the war zone, and the much more modern G36—
where the federal government approved production 
under license for Saudi Arabie in 2008—is now being 
used by various Yemeni groups. According to eyewit-
nesses, these weapons are also used by Sudanese sol-
diers who fight alongside Saudi Arabia in Yemen. 
However, the contractual agreement for licence pro-
duction expressly states that the weapons may only 
be used to equip the Saudi Army. Even the Huthi  
rebels, supported by Iran, are now fighting with cap-
tured G36 rifles. One can also see MG4 machine guns 
as delivered to Saudi Arabia by Heckler & Koch in 
photographs from Yemen. 
The United Arab Emirates participate in the war  
coalition with about 30 to 35 fighter planes, including 
French Mirage 2000, and, after Saudi Arabia, fly the 
majority of air attacks. Strategically, they are concen-
trating more on the south of Yemen in order to sup-
port the separatist movement al-Hirak, which is 
striving for independence. The latter is not only fight-
ing against the Huthi rebels, but since January 2018 
has also been taking military action against the Yem-
eni government troops supported by Saudi Arabia, 
which means that the groups supported by the war 
coalition are now also fighting against each other. In 
addition to the southern separatists, the Abu al Abbas 
'Giants' Brigade, the Shabwani Elite Forces and the 
Security Belt militia, which the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights accuses of war 
crimes and other serious human rights violations in 
a report of August 2018, also receive military training 
and modern Western weapons technology from the 
UAE. Amongst these are armoured vehicles from the 
United States, rifles from Bulgaria, Serbian firearms 
and the German MG3 from Rheinmetall that, mean-
while, is being manufactured by various countries 
under licence. The UAE also supplied hand grenades 
from the RUAG armaments company, which was sup-
plied from Switzerland in 2003 to the Salafist Abu al 
Abbas Brigade. To conquer strategically important cit-
ies (e.g. the port cities of Aden and Hudaida) and cen-
tral infrastructure, the Emirates in Yemen deploy 
their own special forces and ground troops, including 
heavy weapon systems owned by the Emirates: 
Amongst others, videos of the state-owned UAE news 
agency show Leclerc tanks and armoured vehicles of 
the type Oshkosh M-ATV and MRAP. The latter contain 
German components.
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The majority of the soldiers fighting on the ground in 
the country are from Sudan. The approximately 8,000 
infantrymen are mainly from the paramilitary Rapid 
Support Force, which non-governmental organisa-
tions such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch accuse of systematic human rights  
violations. Child soldiers are also said to have been  
recruited for deployment in Yemen, trained in Saudi 
Arabia and equipped with US American small arms. 
According to the government of Senegal, it sent about 
2,100 soldiers to Yemen to take part in the fight 
against the Huthi rebels.
According to a report by the United Nations in Octo-
ber 2015, Eritrea is also involved in the fighting with 
around 400 ground troops, and, like Djibouti and Soma-
lia , it allows the war coalition the use of its military 
bases, airspace and territorial waters. The ground 
troops receive battle instructions via radio from Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE.
In the wake of accusations of support for terrorist  
organisations and the associated diplomatic crisis in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, Qatar's military en-
gagement ended in June 2017. In April 2018, Morocco 
also announced that it would withdraw the six F-16 
fighter planes participating in the Saudi-led war  
coalition against the backdrop of increasing tensions 
with the Polisario movement in Western Sahara.  
Pakistan announced in February 2018 that an unknown 
number of troops would be deployed to Saudi Arabia 
in the framework of bilateral security cooperation 
with Riyadh. So far 1,000 Pakistani soldiers have been 
stationed there, but there is a parliamentary decision 
that confirms Pakistan's neutrality in the Yemen war.
The Arab war coalition is also indirectly supported by 
its Western partners, especially the United States, 
which supplies the war coalition with weapon sys-
tems, especially precision-guided bombs and stand-
off missiles. Air and drone attacks are supported by 
intelligence and logistics.
The Leclerc tanks used in the Battle of Aden in 2015—
the French arms manufacturer Nexter delivered 390 
units to the UAE by 1999—are equipped with German 
MTU 883 diesel engines, while the US-American Osh-
kosh M-ATV used in the battle for the Yemeni city of 
Hudaida carries a remote-controlled FeWas weapon 
station that can be used to automatically track targets 
once they have been identified. This weapon station, 
originally developed by the German company Dynamit 
Nobel Defence from Burbach-Würgendorf, is produced 
in the UAE under licence.
The UAE Navy is participating in the naval blockade 
of allegedly around 20 warships, which also includes 
corvettes from Germany. The "Muray Jib- class missile 
corvettes" of the Emirati Navy—Germany delivered 
two of the Lürssen CM65 corvettes to the UAE  
between 1990 and 1991—are said to have been in-
volved in the naval blockade, and one of the two used 
mine-hunting ships of the Frankenthal class, which 
were exported in 2006 and have since been modern-
ised, accompanied the Emirati warships such as the 
Baynunah corvettes, which are also part of the naval 
blockade. Although these are based on French tech-
nology, they are equipped, among other things, with 
MLG 27 on-board guns manufactured by Rheinmetall 
in Oberndorf, Swabia.
In addition, Germany supplied Rheinmetall's MASS 
system for protection against sensor-guided missiles 
and diesel engines (Model 595) of the Motoren und 
Turbinen Union (MTU) in Friedrichshafen for the 
construction of the corvette.
Egypt is taking part in the naval blockade with speed-
boats and a frigate. In September 2015, Egypt sent 800 
ground troops to fight for the capital Sanaa in Yemen. 
However, it is unclear whether these Egyptian ground 
troops are still involved in the fighting in Yemen at 
present. Apart from Bahrain (15 F-16), Jordan (6 F-16), 
Sudan and Kuwait (12 F/A-18 Hornets), Egypt also 
makes four F-16 fighter aircraft available to the war 
coalition. According to media reports, the Egyptian 
Air Force was also involved in bombings in Yemen.
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Other countries of the war coalition, against which 
the German government has not yet imposed an ex-
port stop, also expect arms deliveries from Germany, 
with the United Arab Emirates receiving six BR-710 
turbines, the export of which was decided between 
2015 and 2017, for three Canadian Global-6000 trans-
port aircraft.  These are to be equipped in Sweden 
with an AEW&C system for airborne air reconnais-
sance and surveillance, which is essential for air war-
fare in Yemen. The Emirati Navy will receive 48 war-
heads and 91 homing heads for the air defence 
systems of its warships.
In September 2018, it also became known that the 
Federal Security Council also approved the delivery of 
385 Dynamite Nobel Defence anti-tank missiles to 
Jordan; Egypt will receive seven SLS air defence sys-
tems from Diehl that uses the IRIS-T SL surface-to-air 
With air-to-air refueling, the United States extended 
the operating time of the F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft 
of the war coalition, at least until November 2018. By 
sending military advisers to Saudi Arabia, the United 
States is helping to locate Huthi missile positions in 
the topographically demanding north of Yemen. Spe-
cialists from Great Britain are also helping the Saudis 
at the military mission centre in Riyadh to select  
targets for air attacks and are training Saudi fighter 
pilots.
Which German arms deliveries are still 
outstanding?
The German government has granted all countries of 
the war coalition, with the exception of Sudan, which 
is subject to EU and UN arms embargoes, arms ex-
ports. The total volume of arms export licences is  
approx. Euro 5.2 billion since 2015.
Among the arms exports to Saudi Arabia approved in 
2018, amounting to around 416 million Euro—Saudi 
Arabia is thus one of the largest recipient countries of 
German arms exports after Algeria, the United States 
and Australia in 2018—are patrol boats, radar systems 
for locating enemy artillery, aircraft parts and equip-
ment for the air-to-air refuelling of aircraft used in 
Yemen.
However, at the time of the export ban in November 
2018, not all arms, for which the export was approved, 
had actually been transferred. Transactions worth 
around 1.5 billion Euro are expected to be affected  
by the export ban, which includes, for example, four 
reconnaissance radar systems for Cobra artillery 
guns. Also, of the 33 armed patrol boats that Saudi 
Arabia had ordered from Peene Shipyard in Wolgast, 
only 15 boats have been delivered so far. In addition, 
Germany has ceased to supply parts (including drives 
and warheads) for Meteor air-to-air missiles for the 
Eurofighter Typhoon - leading to considerable irrita-
tion of Great Britain and France.
Table 1   
Approved German arms exports to the countries of the 
Saudi-led war coalition in Yemen
Recipient country Approval of arms exports 
2015 - 2018 (in Euro)
Egypt 1,141,076,525
Bahrain 22,540,246
Jordan 64,976,894
Qatar 1,716,319,462
Kuwait 201,751,411
Morocco 29,213,479
Saudi-Arabia 1,470,627,873
Senegal 281,245
Sudan 169,000 (UN-Mission)
UAE 535,866,193
Arms export licences up to and including 26 December 2018. Total values for 2018 
derived from parliamentary questions to the federal government. The dates of with-
drawal from the coalition of Qatar (June 2017) and Morocco (April 2018) were  
taken into account in the aggregation of the figures.
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missiles. In addition to two further 209/1400 subma-
rines scheduled for delivery in 2021, Egypt ordered 330 
air-to-air missiles from Germany in 2017, which have 
not yet been delivered. In December 2018, the Federal 
Security Council also approved the export of a Meko 
200 frigate to Egypt.
In November 2018 the shipyard division of Thyssen- 
krupp AG was awarded the contract to build two of 
these frigates. The value of this arms deal is expected 
to be in the region of one billion Euro.
The supply of ammunition is essential for any war-
fare. In Yemen, the war coalition uses inter alia MK80 
series bombs (various types from 250 to 2000 pounds) 
and artillery ammunition, which are manufactured 
in Italy by a subsidiary of the German company 
Rheinmetall and by the South African joint venture 
Rheinmetall Denel Munitions, in which the German 
arms manufacturer, headquartered in Düsseldorf, is 
the majority shareholder. These ammunitions are 
shipped from Italy and South Africa to Saudi Arabia 
and the UAE. Following attacks by the war coalition 
against targets in Yemen, remains of bombs produced 
by the Rheinmetall subsidiary in Italy have been 
found several times. In March 2016, in Al Kharj, 60 
kilometres south-west of Riyadh, a munitions factory 
opened for the local production of mortar ammuni-
tion, artillery ammunition and MK80 series bombs. 
This factory was also built by Rheinmetall Denel  
Munitions. The joint venture also built similar turn-
key munitions factories in the UAE and Egypt.
Conclusion
Without the extensive arms build-up of Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates in particular, through 
Western military technology, the war in Yemen by 
the Sunni-Arab war coalition would not have been 
possible.
In view of the flagrant violation of international  
humanitarian law by the countries involved in the 
Yemen war, export moratoria of limited duration, 
such as the current ban on arms exports to Saudi  
Arabia until 30 March, are not sufficient. A compre-
hensive arms embargo against all states of the coalition 
led by Saudi Arabia is necessary, particularly due to 
the active participation of other countries in the air 
raids, the naval blockade in the Red Sea and the 
transfer of arms to Yemeni militias. Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, 
Sudan and Senegal are directly involved with their 
military in the Yemen war. All of these countries, 
therefore should not receive any military equipment, 
including components, from Germany until further 
notice. All export licences already granted—for exam-
ple the licence to export further patrol boats to Saudi 
Arabia—should be revoked. Claims for damages by 
the arms industry would incur if it were not possible 
to find other buyers for the weapons systems already 
produced. These would be the price Germany would 
have to pay for countering a further escalation of the 
war in Yemen and a worsening of the humanitarian 
situation. They would also be the costs of a short- 
sighted arms export policy in which for many years, 
the German government completely misjudged the 
risks of arms exports to authoritarian states in crisis 
areas to international security, peace and human 
rights. One lesson to be learnt from this is that the 
rules of arms export policy in Germany should be  
designed in such a way that arms exports to such 
states actually only take place in very few and excep-
tional cases that have to be justified explicitly.In its 
recent arms export report, the Joint Conference 
Church and Development (GKKE) presented proposals 
on how this could be designed in concrete terms.
Within the EU, Germany should support the European 
Parliament's demand to stop supplying Saudi Arabia 
with military equipment. The European Parliament 
had already called for this in February 2016 and re-
peated this demand in November 2017.
Germany should adopt this demand and at least ex-
tend it to the UAE. It will certainly be extremely diffi-
cult to win over arms export-friendly countries such 
as France for this. Particularly in view of the intended 
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cooperation between Germany and France in the de-
velopment of future weapons systems and the con-
cerns of the French government about German ex-
port restrictions expressed in this context, this seems 
virtually impossible. Nevertheless, cooperation be-
tween France and Germany in the field of armaments 
technology is in the interest of both governments.
This is why Germany must insist on concessions 
from France in view of arms exports restrictions. 
Should France insist on arms exports in light of an 
ongoing war, massive violations of international hu-
manitarian law and the illegal transfer of weapons, 
this would fundamentally call into question any clo-
ser arms cooperation.
Critics may argue that an arms embargo could at best 
have a long-term effect on the behaviour of the war 
coalition countries. To counter this, one may argue 
that a comprehensive arms embargo, which would be 
supported by as many countries as possible, could 
also exert pressure in the short term, especially if it 
covered the main critical goods of this war—spare 
parts and ammunition. Since Rheinmetall's muni-
tions exports are handled by foreign subsidiaries or 
joint ventures, the German government currently has 
no legal means of exerting any influence by refusing 
or revoking export licenses, which it has in the case 
of components supplied from within Germany. It 
could, however, as in the case of the already approved 
but stopped exports from Germany after the Kashog-
gi murder pursue a ‘strategy of discouragement’ to 
persuade Rheinmetall to stop further exports to the 
countries of the war coalition. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that, beyond the hu-
manitarian catastrophe in Yemen, there are addition-
al good reasons for the Federal Government not to 
supply any more arms to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and 
the other countries of the war coalition. If it is in the 
foreign and security policy interest of Germany to 
maintain a ‘rule based international order’ and if the 
government thus wants to ’pioneer’ the development 
and enforcement of such an order—as Foreign Minis-
ter Heiko Maaß never tires of emphasising—then it is 
crucial for its credibility to adhere to these rules itself 
and to help them to be implemented—although and 
especially when this incurs costs. These rules include 
international humanitarian law and the Internation-
al Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The continued arming of 
the war coalition promotes the erosion of interna-
tional humanitarian law, in particular the principles 
for the protection of civilians. The ATT—just like the 
EU Common Position on the export of military tech-
nology and equipment, which is legally binding for 
all EU Member States—prohibits arms exports if 
there is a clear risk that they will be used to violate 
international humanitarian law. For most arms  
exports to the war coalition such a risk can only  
be dismissed if the war in Yemen is ignored.
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